After consolidation of power Islamic "Hijab" (outfit) was made mandatory even for young girls at Primary Schools
After the revolution of Iran was complete and the Islamic Republic firmly in place, changes began to take place. Reforms were made in practically all spheres of life- social, economic and legal. Many of these changes placed women at the forefront of politics. Just as women played an important role in the eye of the public during the Pahlavi regime, these same women were scrutinized under the Islamic Republic. Many Western feminists are up in arms, claiming that women have suffered a huge draw back under the Islamic Republic and are using a select group of urban middle class women as a reference for all of Iran. This chapter will be examining the changes in women's roles under clerical rule and arguing the changes were not nearly as drastic nor as negative as is widely believed.
Women's roles underwent some very fundamental changes both before and after the Islamic Revolution. Once Khomeini was in power, he made sure that the Family Rights Act (FPA) was repealed. The FPA had given women certain legal rights that they didn't possess before and with the removal of the Shah, those rights disappeared. However, the matter is not so clear cut, since many of these women were never aware of their rights especially rural women and many of the rights were never enforced. So in actuality many of these women did not lose that much power.
Urban women were the ones most affect by the removal of the FPA by Ayatollah Khomeini. Although the loss of these legal rights should not be ignored, they have been grossly exaggerated due to misconceptions of both the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic Republic. Contrary to accusations, the Islamic Republic is not trying to bring back archaic laws from the time of Mohammed, shari'a law has been influencing the laws in Iran throughout its entire history and was intact until 1967.[1] Essentially, both shari'a law and the FPA were the same. The FPA didn't depart much from shari'a law, a lot of it was merely revised shari'a, in a compromise between modernization and religion. The Family Protection Acts were a brief interlude in the continuous history of shari'a law. The only difference is that the FPA made less distinctions between rights for men and women. The main changes of the Pahlavi Dynasty was that they tried to de-emphasize the biological differences between men and women. Women were guaranteed the right to education and schooling was compulsory for both boys and girls. The Pahlavi regime also guaranteed equal pay for equal work, maternity leave and day care. Politically, women had the right to vote and to serve in elected offices.
Guity Nashat argues that women have lost a lot of ground with the change in government. She points to several different factors that contribute to women's loss, especially; the abrogation of laws enacted under the Pahlavi regime and the dwindling employment opportunities. But, as we saw in the first chapter, the reality of women's gains were different from the legalities of them. Just because the laws were there on paper, doesn't mean that they were actually followed or enforced. Nesta Ramazani says on the repeal of the FPA, "...the reversion to shari'a law wouldn't necessarily cause Iranian women great concern" and "Studies undertaken on the marriage ages and fertility rates of Iranian women do not seem to show an appreciable change."[2] She attributes the failure of these laws to their lax enforcement.[3]
As to Nashat's second grievance, there has been a slight decrease in economic activity for women. But she herself says that its due to the "deteriorating economic system."[4] Iran has suffered an economic decline due to the Iran/Iraq war. The economic decline is independent of the Islamic Republic, and they should not be held responsible for women's disappearance from the work force due to conditions beyond their control.
A number of other laws remained essentially unchanged under the Islamic Republic, since most were already based on shari'a law. Women still retained the right to receive economic support from her husband, regardless of her personal wealth, the right to inherit (although it was still half) and the right to make contracts. Women could also still own and dispose of property independently. In addition women are legally entitled to mahriyeh, which is a specific amount of money or property that a husband promises to his wife in their marriage contract and is not given to the wife in full, except in cases of divorce. The mahriyeh can help deter rash divorces and gives the women some independent economic control.
Marriage
Due to the emphasis on family, marriage is how Muslim women achieve status. Women who are unmarried or divorced find themselves at a distinct disadvantage. It is unacceptable for a man to marry a divorcée, except if she is a second wife or a temporary marriage. In 1976 the ratio of unmarried urban men to unmarried urban women was 49 to 100, indicating a much higher remarriage rate for men. At age 55, the ratio was 55 to 100.[5] The unmarried state of women is directly proportional to both their economic and mental well being, since they live in a society that is so centered around the family. The economic situation for divorced women is more than likely to deteriorate, since the emphasis of women's role has been in a domestic capacity.
A wife's role has remained virtually the same under clerical rule as it was under the Shah. Both shari'a and Pahlavi law uphold a wife's right to sexual intercourse. A husband's unwillingness or incapability to perform his husbandly duties is grounds for divorce of annulment, whether or not the marriage is polygamous or monogamous. A wife has both sexual duties and childbearing ones. Failure to fulfill either of these is also grounds for divorce or annulment. A married man under both shari'a and Pahlavi law was also entitled to have as many wives from sigeh as he wished, whereas a wife was entitled to only one husband. The laws surrounding adultery also remained the same, with the punishment for women being more severe than for men. One final duty of the wife that encompassed both sets of rules was obedience. A wife had to be obedient to her husband under the FPA and under shari'a law. Under both systems the husband is clearly the head of the household.
Polygamy
The practice of polygamy was not changed by the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. The same requirements were still needed in order for a man to take on another wife. With the repeal of the FPA polygamy was no more accessible under the Islamic Republic than it was under the Pahlavi regime. A man still needs court consent to marry a second woman, and his wife still needs to testify to her husband's ability to support another wife both physically and financially. Additionally, polygamy was never an important issue in Iran. The number of men that have more than one wife has always been extremely low, and has been declining as time progresses. In 1966 only one percent of all married men had more than one wife, and most of those existed outside of urban areas.[6] According to the 1976 Census of Population, the ratio of men with two or more wives to those with only one wife is 11 to 1,000.[7]
Sigeh
Iranian women dicuss a passage in the Koran beneath a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini at the Kosarieh women's semiary in Tehran
Temporary marriage is a state that is very controversial in the Islamic World, especially in more urban areas. Sigeh, under the Islamic Republic was now receiving a lot of support and encouragement. The Islamic Republic made a point to educate the people about the advantageous and Islamic duties of sigeh.
Sigeh is not actually an Islamic practice, but a pre-Islamic one used in Arab tribes. In its pre-Islamic form women still resided with her family, her kin still retained rights, a woman could also dismiss a man, and any children begotten belonged to the wife's lineage. In Islam, sigeh changed, so that the child now belonged to the father. The practice of sigeh was primarily used as an urban function associated with long distance trade.
Sigeh is officially a contract between a man and a woman were the amount of time and bride price must be specified in advance. Registration of the marriage is optional, and no witnesses are required. Sigeh literally means "a man agrees to give a women something for a specified period of time in return for sexual favors with the understanding there would be no marriage in the beginning and no divorce in the end."[8]
The length of the marriage varies, ranging from a few hours to a few years. It differs from permanent marriage in that the wife's family cannot intervene. A man is not limited to the number of temporary marriages he can have, as he is limited to four permanent wives. After the termination of a sigeh, a woman has a period of idda afterwards. Idda is a waiting period of two menstrual cycles to determine if there was any pregnancies during the marriage, regardless of how short the union was. If a woman has already reached menopause, however, idda is not necessary.
Many people have compared sigeh to prostitution, but it is different in the eyes of Muslims for two reasons. First, any children that come of a sigeh marriage are considered legitimate. Second, sigeh is thought to combat immorality. Sigeh is a spiritual and religious state, where as prostitution is disorder.
Sigeh is also beneficial to women in several ways. For one thing it is less restrictive, women do not have to be as obedient during a sigeh marriage as opposed to a permanent one. Sigeh marriage is a way in which women can be with many men legally in the same way that man can take other wives. She is able to be with different people under the blessings of Islam. Also, the man has to stipulate the specific time of day that he will be visiting his wife. Shahla Haeri interviewed many women who participated in sigeh, and found that many of them used it to their own advantage. They would use it for economic security, or a way to satiate their sexual desires. Women have also often used sigeh as a way to either resist permanent marriage, or to resist being fully possessed by a man. One woman in particular, Mahvash, was very verbose on the subject. She participated in sigeh for two of the reasons stated above, economic and sexual. She said on the sexual aspects of sigeh, "I want to get married [her euphemism for sex] all the time, every night."[9] Mahvash often expressed resentment at having to wait out the idda period, for it deprived her of a time to make money. She was fulfilling her own agenda through the use of sigeh and was often the one approaching men with the proposition.
Divorce
Data from divorces show that Iranian women that marry later on in life are more inclined to divorce than other women. In 1976 50 percent of all divorcing urban women were marriage at age 19 or older, and in 1981 the number had risen to 60 percent.[10] It has also been found that couples with no children are more prone to divorce than those with children. In 1976, 51.9 percent of urban couples who got approved for divorce were childless.[11] The numbers about divorce and children support many of the precepts of Islam. That men and women have their own distinct duties to fulfill, the woman's mainly resting in the domestic sphere. Additionally, the numbers of childless couples to divorce also support Islam's notions of reproductive duty. Often people point out that Islamic laws are barbaric in that a woman can be divorced because of her failure to reproduce. Once again, however, people fail to look at the reality. In Iran, less than 2 percent of divorces are claimed to be for infertility.[12]
Under the Pahlavi regime, many women did not receive their dowries upon divorce. More than 50 percent of women in the city of Shiraz forfeited their dowries, and some women only received half of it in 1976. In 1981, the situation improved for women, only 38.7 percent of women ended up forfeiting their dowries.
Type of Agreement
1976
1981
Forfeited
25
165
Half-forfeited
17
100
Paid in full
17
94
Unknown
25
81
Total
21
74
Table 3.1 : Agreement on Payment of Dowry for Divorce Women in Shiraz[13]
As the number indicates, women collection of dowries improved in most categories. The Islamic Republic was not ignoring the needs of women. Under their leadership less women were forfeiting their dowries, and more women receiving full payment of their dowries.
In 1986 the Majlis passed a twelve article law on marriage and divorce that limited the privileges given to men by custom and traditional interpretations of Islam.[14] All marriages now allow for prenuptial agreements and recognize women's right to a share of the property couples acquire during their marriage and increased alimony rights. Article 1 provides that if a divorce is sought by a husband, and if the divorce is not prompted by the wife's moral deficiencies, then she is entitled to half of his worldly goods, or a cash equivalent.[15] Article 12 of the 1986 law further restricts the act of polygamy.[16]
It grants women the right to divorce their husband for taking a second wife without their permission, or if the courts deem that a husband is not treating his wives equally as required by Islamic law.
Reproduction
Often, people hold up the issue of birth control and abortion as proof of the Islamic Republic's backwardness. However, it is unjust to give credit to the Pahlavi regime for their legalization of abortion in 1977. For even though abortion was legal, it was not a widely known fact. Women did not have access to it, because they were not informed that it existed. The only women aware of it were the women camping for it, the middle class professional woman. And they were also the only women that could afford the practice. Lower class women still had to resort to the self-induced abortions that they had been using for years before 1977.
Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (an Islamic directive) in 1980 approving of birth control as long as the mother and child were not harmed, and excluded abortion. Although the Islamic Republic did not make any great efforts to promote birth control, as time progressed, they realized population was becoming a problem. In 1988, Prime Minister Hosein Moosavi announced that population was being reinstated as a policy issue. In the following month a committee was formed to consider the issue of population growth. In December of 1988 Iran's began a family planning program, and Khomeini publicly asked women to prevent unwanted births and to see care in government health clinics.[17]
In 1989 the Islamic Consultative Assembly issued a national birth control policy. The first five year plan included policies to reduce population, increase contraceptive coverage and educate women and to promote women's participation in the social and economic matters of family planning.[18] The family planning program offered a variety of contraceptives either free, or at very low costs, in contrast with the Pahlavi regime, which only offered one method of contraception, the pill. Abortions are also no longer strictly forbidden, as they were in the early stages of the Islamic Republic, so long as it is done before quickening (the time of ensoulment for Islam).
Labor Force
Within the labor force, the participation of women has always been low. Western feminists often blame the low rate of employment on the Islamic Republic. But women have never been highly represented in the work force, and other external factors have contributed to their withdrawal from the labor force other than the Islamic Republic. Iran's economic conditions dropped due to the Iran-Iraq war, the drastic effects of the economic embargo and the falling prices of oil. [19]
Young women born and raised under the Islamic rule and education system of Islamic Republic
Val Maghadam says, on the topic of women's employment after the Islamic Republic installation into power, "the massive expulsion of women from modern-sector employment initially envisioned by the new ruling authorities has not been effected."
For the most part, changes in employment patterns have remained relatively low. The proportion of women employed in government agencies stayed about the same at 28 percent between 1974 and 1983 and women even receive training as part of paramilitary units called the "Zeinab Sisters."[20]
Akbar Aghajanian did a study of women's equality in Iran, basing it on several factors, including education, economics, and development. He claims that women in Iran suffer from a "high level of inequality" due to their low access to resources. Akbar claims that women are oppressed, due to their lack of equality in the work force. He estimates the male to female employment ratio to 0.16 in Iran.[21] His first problem is his conception of "work." Many women work in Iran, but do so either in family businesses or in the household and there work is not included in employment surveys. Statistics also show that there was relatively little decline from pre to post-revolutionary Iran in urban women's employment. In 1976 the total number of employed urban females was 11.2, and the number remained unchanged in 1983.[22] Additionally, he assumes that women aren't in the work force because they are incapable of entering the field. Yet a study conducted over a two-year period found that Iranian women didn't want to work. They felt that work was an obligation only undertaken out of necessity, such as when men are sick, at war or unable to support the family. The study found that 72 percent of the women interviewed did not feel that working outside the home was a major goal nor was it highly valued.[23] The second problem with Akbar's argument is that he concludes that women are oppressed due to their lack resources. The only resources that he is legitimating are those in the public sphere and he completely discounts women's access to resources in the domestic sphere and to their access and control over household economics and food.
The Islamic government recognizes the double burden that working women in Iran carry, having both the care of their children and their homes, and their work, and the government enacted laws to try to deal with these issues. A 1985 law mandated part-time work privileges for mothers of young children. It also instituted three months of paid maternity leave, and two half hour periods per day for nursing mothers to feed their babies.[24] Pension benefits were also established for women, and it was decreed that companies hiring women should provide day-care facilities for young children of female employees.
Education
Although there have been some slight changes in the educational system in Iran, women are not excluded from the education process. It's often said that women no longer have access to education under the Islamic Republic, which is entirely untrue. The constitution of the Islamic Republic mandates that government provide free education through middle school for all and the government has continued to provide education for women. The role of education can be gauged in several different ways. One way is through pure numbers and statistics, doing a comparison between enrollment under the Pahlavi era and under the Islamic Republic. Another way to examine the role of women, and one that gives us insight into women's idealized roles is through the new text books that Iran is using since the demise of the Pahlavi regime. Textbooks give us a rare insight into the ideology of the Islamic Republic, since socialization starts at an early age. The way in which relations are depicted in textbooks are clues into the ideological foundations of a government.
Statistics show that women continued on the same path to education that they followed under the Shahs. Women's enrollment in educational institution did not decline. Statistics indicate an increase in the amount of female students attending school at all levels. The numbers show that women's enrollment increased under the Islamic Republic.
Year
1976 and 1977
1986 and 1987
Total Enrollment
Percentage Female
Total Enrollment
Percentage Female
Elementary
4,768,588
38
7,232,820
44
Middle
1,377,696
36
2,299,510
39
Secondary
979,182
36
1,292,013
40
Academic
740,471
40
1,076,762
43
Vocational
192,332
10
201,159
23
Technical
98,518
2
106,829
7
Business
84,233
32
86,183
54
Table 3.2 : Female Proportion of School Enrollment[25]
Statistics for the academic year of 1986/1987 show that female admission to fields such as dentistry, physiotherapy, audiology, and radiology was on par with male admissions. In other traditionally male dominated spheres, such as agriculture and veterinary medicine, female admissions rose from zero to 10 percent. In 1992, roughly 42 percent of Iran's university graduates were women.[26]
The Islamic Republic wasted little time in making adjustments to Iran's educational system. Some of the most widely noted changes were the conversion of all co-educational schools into single-sex institutions, the revision of textbooks, the elimination of private schools, and a new Islamic dress code. The educational system is another example of people just looking at the surface of the changes made by the Republic. It should be noted that before these reforms, like the elimination of co-ed schools, most of Iran's schools were already segregated by sex. As to the new dress code, for girls, most had always worn a uniform to school, which consisted of a long sleeve, knee length smock, worn over pants, and many of the women and girls attending these schools had always worn modest head coverings, even while discouraged by the Pahlavi government.
While the Islamic Republic has put some restrictions on the content of female education, it has by no means restricted it. In fact, the government, when necessary, ha gone as far as to bend the rules, like the single-sex institutions, to provide girls with education.[27] In rural areas, where there aren't enough children or instructors of the appropriate sex to support two separate schools, they allow co-ed institutions, or girls to be taught by male teachers, when there is a lack of qualified women to do the job.
Among the school texts used, the only one that was dramatically altered was the religion texts.[28] The other text books had some minor, less pronounced changes made to them. The organization of the text remained the same, as did the manner in which math and reading were taught. Science continues to have the same status that it did before the revolution. The textbooks were authored by even authored by the same three people before the revolution as after.
The most obvious change in the textbooks are the pictures that are used. Whereas coeducation and unveiled women were portrayed in the old textbooks, the new ones portray more modest Islamic dress. Additionally, the text books are more orientated towards the lower and lower-middle classes, contrasting with the more professional and urban middle classes that in the texts from the Pahlavi era.
It is important to note that 60 percent of the Islamic Republic's lessons were essentially equal to those of the Pahlavi era. Specifically, of the 54 lessons that were examined by Patricia Higgins and Pirouz Ghaffi, 15 percent of them were identically, and 44 percent were slightly revised, the main revisions being a different picture, changes in words or occasionally, a removed sentence.[29]
In terms of overall visibility, women have lost some ground. Females were included 80 percent as often under the Pahlavi era, as opposed to 54 percent as often in the Islamic Republic.[30] However, the situation that women were portrayed in remained very much the same in both sets of textbooks. And if we examine the numbers of women pictured, rather than there presence or absence in each lesson, the numbers show that women's visibility has only decreased slightly, from 45 percent to 43 percent.[31]
As to the portrayal of women's occupations in these textbooks, there was, once again, only a slight difference. Women portrayed doing any kind of work from the pre-revolutionary text books was only at 23 percent, and 17 percent in the revised texts.[32] Even in the Pahlavi era, nearly half of the lessons were women were portrayed working, the work was housework. In both sets of texts, three quarters of the professional women shown were teaching. The remained of women were in agricultural positions. Neither sets of books showed women in blue collar or service positions.
Sex and Occupation
Number
Pahlavi Era (%)
Number
Islamic Rep. Era (%)
Women
Professional
14
38
7
29
Agriculture
5
13
2
8
Housework
18
49
15
62
Total (women)
37
24
Men
Professional
27
43
25
37
Agriculture
19
31
22
32
Blue Collar
6
10
5
7
Trade-Craft
7
11
13
19
Military
3
5
3
4
Total (men)
62
68
Table 3.3 : Occupations of Women and Men by Period[33]
The role of family was also examined in these textbooks. No statistically different percentages were found in the proportion of lessons portraying families. In fact, families were show less in the Islamic Republic textbooks than those during the Pahlavi era. For the Islamic Republic, it was 36 percent of 144 lessons, and for the Pahlavi textbooks, it was 50 percent of 161 lessons. In both eras, nearly all families portrayed were nuclear families.[34]
Jaqcuiline Touba did an analysis of elementary school books prepared by the Islamic Republic to examine the values toward sex roles being propagated by the ulama. She concluded that the Islamic Republic has only "done away with egalitarian norms."[35] Although whose norms she is talking about is left vague, its highly doubtful that she is referring to Iranian norms. Save the Pahlavi regime, "egalitarian norms" in the sense she means (the Western sense) has never been a large part of the Iranian culture.
Touba goes on in her essay to demonstrate why the women have lost status under the Islamic Republic, as compared to the Pahlavi era. She says, "The patriarchal orientation of the present regime has definitely been incorporated into elementary texts. Thus, it will serve to reinforce the traditional values concerning women's role in a society which are held by the majority of the population."[36] This statement is problematic, because in this very article, Touba admits that she has no point of reference. "Unfortunately, text books used before the revolution were not readily available at the time of this study in order to allow a comparative analysis before and after the revolution."[37] Touba did not compare these textbooks to those of the Pahlavi regime, nor did she even make an attempt to compare them to findings of textbooks from other countries, be them first or third world. Touba concludes that the rise of the Islamic Republic has brought setbacks to the educational system without examining the previous one.
There have be no radical changes, or even major ones in the textbooks used in Iran. Women still have a prominent role in these books, no less of one that in the Pahlavi era. Contentions that the Islamic Republic is withholding, or giving second-rate education to the women of Iran are untrue. The enrollment of women in schools has actually increased under the Islamic Republic.
Conclusion
The new constitution of the Islamic Republic reasserts the distinctiveness of male and female roles, where the Pahlavi regime sought to ignore them. Women are still entitled to education, but only in single sex schools. They have not been barred from working outside the home, but day care, maternity leave and lay offs are societal pressures for women to return to the home. Women still retain the right to vote and to serve in most elected offices, except for president and judge.
Through examining the many spheres that surround women's lives in Iran, its apparent that the changes enacted by the Islamic Republic were not nearly as oppressive as perceived. The changes that were made to the constitution were not all that dramatic; they just didn't mask their rules in modernity, like the Pahlavi regime had.
Footnotes
Patricia J. Higgins, “Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal, Social and Ideological Changes,” Signs 10 (1985): 479.
Nesta Ramazani, “Behind the Veil: Status of Women in Revolutionary Iran,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 4 (1980): 31.
Nesta Ramazani, “Behind the Veil: Status of Women in Revolutionary Iran,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 4 (1980): 32.
Guity Nashat, “Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iranian Studies 13 (1980): 165.
Akbir Aghajanian, “Some Notes on Divorce in Iran,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 48 (1986): 753.
Patricia J. Higgins, “Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal, Social and Ideological Changes,” Signs 10 (1985): 485.
Akbir Aghajanian, “Some Notes on Divorce in Iran,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 48 (1986): 750.
Eliz Sanasarian, The Women’s Rights Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement and Repression form 1900 to Khomeini (USA: Praeger Publishers, 1982) 233.
Shahla Haeri, Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi’i Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989) 110.
Akbir Aghajanian, “Some Notes on Divorce in Iran,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 48 (1986): 752.
Akbir Aghajanian, “Some Notes on Divorce in Iran,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 48 (1986): 750.
Akbir Aghajanian, “Some Notes on Divorce in Iran,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 48 (1986): 752.
Akbir Aghajanian, “Some Notes on Divorce in Iran,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 48 (1986): 754.
Nesta Ramazani, “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47 (1993): 417.
Nesta Ramazani, “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47 (1993): 417.
Nesta Ramazani, “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47 (1993): 417.
Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, “Reproductive Choice in Islam: Gender and the State in Iran and Tunisia,” Studies in Family Planning 25 (1994): 46.
Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, “Reproductive Choice in Islam: Gender and the State in Iran and Tunisia,” Studies in Family Planning 25 (1994): 47.
Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, “Reproductive Choice in Islam: Gender and the State in Iran and Tunisia,” Studies in Family Planning 25 (1994): 47.
Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, “Reproductive Choice in Islam: Gender and the State in Iran and Tunisia,” Studies in Family Planning 25 (1994): 47.
Akbir Aghajanian, “The Impact of Development on the Status of Women: A District Level Analysis in Iran,” Journal of Developing Societies 7 (1991): 295.
Eliz Sanasarian, The Women’s Right Movement in Iran: Mutiny Appeasement and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini (USA: Praeger Press, 1982) 63.
Nesta Ramazani, “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47 (1993): 413.
Nesta Ramazani, “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47 (1993): 413.
Mahnaz Afkhami, and Erika Friedl. In the Eye of the Storm: Women in Post-revolutionary Iran (Great Britain: Syracuse University Press, 1994) 22.
Nesta Ramazani, “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47 (1993): 412.
Patricia J. Higgins, and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari. “Sex-role Socialization in Iranian Textbooks,” NWSA Journal 3 (1991): 217.
Mahnaz Afkhami, and Erika Friedl. In the Eye of the Storm: Women in Post-revolutionary Iran (Great Britain: Syracuse University Press, 1994) 36.
Patricia J. Higgins, and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari. “Sex-role Socialization in Iranian Textbooks,” NWSA Journal 3 (1991): 224.
Mahnaz Afkhami, and Erika Friedl. In the Eye of the Storm: Women in Post-revolutionary Iran (Great Britain: Syracuse University Press, 1994) 38.
Patricia J. Higgins, and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari. “Sex-role Socialization in Iranian Textbooks,” NWSA Journal 3 (1991): 224.
Patricia J. Higgins, and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari. “Sex-role Socialization in Iranian Textbooks,” NWSA Journal 3 (1991): 227.
Patricia J. Higgins, and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari. “Sex-role Socialization in Iranian Textbooks,” NWSA Journal 3 (1991): 228.
Patricia J. Higgins, and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari. “Sex-role Socialization in Iranian Textbooks,” NWSA Journal 3 (1991): 229.
Jacquiline Rudolph Touba, “Cultural Effects on Sex Role Images in Elementary School Books in Iran: A Content Analysis After the Revolution,” International Journal of Sociology and the Family 17 (1987): 145.
Jacquiline Rudolph Touba, “Cultural Effects on Sex Role Images in Elementary School Books in Iran: A Content Analysis After the Revolution,” International Journal of Sociology and the Family 17 (1987): 144.
Jacquiline Rudolph Touba, “Cultural Effects on Sex Role Images in Elementary School Books in Iran: A Content Analysis After the Revolution,” International Journal of Sociology and the Family 17 (1987): 146.
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